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Singapore’s New Discretionary Death Penalty for Drug Couriers 
Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2013] SGHC 221 
 
 
Background 
 
Singapore has always adopted an uncompromising stance against drug trafficking. Harsh 
punishments – ranging from caning and imprisonment to the death penalty – have largely 
been justified on the policy grounds that drug addiction has the demonstrable potential to 
destroy the fabric of society, break up families, and cause addicts to turn to violent crime to 
feed their addiction.1 These punishments are coupled with a series of presumptions built into 
the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA),2 designed to thwart the efforts of drug syndicates from 
around the region to smuggle their merchandise into Singapore. For instance, under s. 18 of 
the MDA, any person who is found with controlled drugs is presumed to have had that drug 
in his possession and also presumed to have known the nature of that drug.3 In addition, 
under s. 17, if the controlled drugs in question exceed a certain quantity, there is a 
presumption that it is for the purpose of trafficking. A successful conviction for drug 
trafficking could, depending on the quantity trafficked set out in the charge, lead to the 
mandatory death penalty.4 Human rights and constitutional challenges have been mounted 
against the MDA over the years, but none of them have ever succeeded in court.5 
 
Perhaps in a bid to ‘draw a very careful, calibrated distinction between the different levels of 
accountability’ between kingpins and mules in drug syndicates, and to ‘temper and mitigate 
the harsh drug laws with compassion’, the MDA was amended in 2012.6 One of the changes 
was the introduction of s. 33B, which gives any judge hearing a capital drug trafficking case 
the discretion to impose a sentence of life imprisonment7 and caning instead of the death 
penalty for low-level drug operatives if two conjunctive conditions are met.8 First, the 
accused must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his role in the offence (of drug 
                                                 
* I would like to thank my students Al-gene Tan Qing Wei and Jerome Yang Zhelun for their invaluable 
comments and research rendered for this piece, though any errors remain mine. 
1 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012. 
2 Chapter 185, Revised Edition 2008. 
3 For a commentary on these presumptions, see C. Siyuan and N. Khng, ‘Possession and Knowledge in the 
Misuse of Drugs Act’ [2012] 30 Singapore Law Review 181. 
4 See ss. 5, 7 and 33 and the Second Schedule of the MDA.  
5 See generally C. Siyuan, ‘A Preliminary Survey of the Right to Presumption of Innocence in Singapore’ 
(2012) 7 LawAsia Journal 78; C. Siyuan, ‘The Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Singapore: Past, Present, 
and Future’ (2013) 2(1) International Review of Law 1. 
6 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012 
(Edwin Tong). One of the recurring criticisms by opponents to the mandatory death penalty is that more often 
than not, the traffickers arrested are the ‘mules’ rather than the masterminds of drug syndicates. Yong Vui Kong 
v Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 SLR 489 was one such case. 
7 For a commentary on the meaning of ‘life imprisonment’, see C. Siyuan, ‘The Meaning of ‘Life 
Imprisonment’ in the Context of a Presidential Commutation Order’ March/2012 Singapore Law Watch 
Commentaries. 
8 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012 
(Teo Chee Hean). 
trafficking) was restricted to that of a courier within his drug syndicate;9 and second, the 
prosecution must certify that the accused had substantively assisted the Central Narcotics 
Bureau (CNB) in disrupting drug trafficking activities within or without Singapore.10 Before 
the 2012 amendments, an accused facing a capital trafficking charge was already in an 
unenviable position. But did the amendments make matters more difficult? The High Court in 
Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan11 thought so. Notably, this was only the second case to 
have considered and applied s. 33B of the MDA.12 
 
Decision in Chum Tat Suan 
 
The accused was charged with importing 94.96 grams of diamorphine into Singapore.13 His 
main defence was that the bag (which contained the drugs) found in the boot of the taxi he 
was in was not his. He also maintained that in any event, he did not know what was in the 
bag. The judge did not believe this defence and convicted him, and s. 33B of the MDA was 
triggered. The judge sought submissions for the separate hearing on sentencing and the 
parties returned with a jointly agreed proposal.14 According to that proposal, the judge must 
first determine if the accused was indeed a courier; if the answer is no, the mandatory death 
penalty ensues. If the answer is yes, the prosecution would – presumably after seeking an 
adjournment of the hearing – record a statement from the accused so that the prosecution can 
decide if it wishes to certify that the accused had substantively assisted CNB in disrupting 
drug trafficking activities within or without Singapore. If the prosecution so certifies, the 
judge would then decide if the death penalty or life imprisonment and caning is the more 
appropriate punishment.15 The judge described this proposal as giving rise to a ‘significant 
difficulty’.16 He explained:17 
 
I have already convicted the accused on the basis of findings of fact that I have made. 
But now I have to make new findings … for the purposes of sentencing … If I allow 
parties to introduce new evidence … there is the possibility of evidence emerging that 
might undermine the findings of facts that I had earlier made in convicting the 
accused. There is even the possibility of evidence emerging that casts doubt on the 
guilt of the accused. On the other hand, if I do not allow the introduction of any new 
evidence … there is a possibility of prejudice to the accused, in that he might have 
                                                 
9 ‘Courier’ is not used in the MDA; the actual words used are ‘transporting, sending or delivering’ controlled 
drugs. It was also clarified in Parliament that s. 33B would not extend to accused persons who have packed or 
stored the drugs: Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 
November 2012 (Teo Chee Hean). 
10 Alternatively, it is open to the accused to prove (under the second condition), also on a balance of 
probabilities, that he was suffering from an abnormality of mind to that extent that it had substantially impaired 
his mental responsibility This is known as the defence of diminished responsibility, which under the Penal Code 
(Chapter 224, Revised Edition 2008) is a specific defence to culpable homicide. 
11 [2013] SGHC 221. The High Court is the second-highest court in Singapore, after the Court of Appeal. It 
should be noted that the judge who heard this case also heard Public Prosecutor v Abdul Kahar bin Othman 
[2013] SGHC 222, which also dealt in part with the same issues. The two judgments were released on the same 
day. 
12 The first was Public Prosecutor v Abdul Haleem bin Abdul Karim [2013] 3 SLR 734, but issues relating to 
evidence did not arise.  
13 See Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2013] SGHC 150. 
14 Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2013] SGHC 221 at [4]. 
15 An additional step was actually proposed: if the prosecution declines to certify, both parties would proceed to 
make submissions on whether the accused nonetheless was suffering from an abnormality of mind at the 
material time. 
16 Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2013] SGHC 221 at [5]. 
17 Ibid. 
conducted his defence in such a manner as to furnish no occasion for evidence of his 
being no more than a ‘courier’ to emerge at trial …  
 
The judge further noted that the alternative approaches to either decide issues of conviction 
and sentence together or to have the sentencing submissions to be based only on the evidence 
adduced at trial would put the accused ‘in a bind’:18 
 
[I]n order to make the claim that he was no more than a ‘courier’, the accused must 
first admit that he was trafficking or importing or exporting drugs. Choosing not to 
admit this might subsequently preclude him from arguing that he was no more than a 
‘courier’ should the court convict him nonetheless. For instance, if the accused elects 
to remain silent because he is of the opinion that the prosecution has not made out a 
case against him, and the court convicts him anyway, he would not have had the 
opportunity to give evidence for the purposes of proving that he was no more than a 
‘courier’. If his case was that he did not know that he had drugs in his possession, or 
that he had them in his possession for his own personal consumption … it would be 
difficult or impossible for him to argue that he was no more than a ‘courier’. One 
response might be that the accused must take a position and stick with it. But the onus 
is not on the accused to take positions … This must especially be so when the 
punishment sought to be visited on the accused is the sentence of death. 
 
The judge eventually held that on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial that led to the 
accused’s conviction, the accused was no more than a courier.19 
 
Analysis 
 
Without saying as much, the judge in Chum Tat Suan must have been referring to the 
privilege against self-incrimination and concomitantly, the right to presumption of 
innocence.20 On his analysis, an accused drug courier can probably only avail himself of s. 
33B of the MDA if he had in some way confessed to liability before or during the trial – how 
else can he satisfy the first requirement of being just a courier in the drug syndicate? The 
usual defences raised by persons accused of drug trafficking would be to either deny 
knowledge of the existence of the drugs that are found on them or their belongings, or to deny 
knowledge of the contents of what they were told to traffic – these were the defences raised 
in Chum Tat Suan; this also explains why the presumptions in s. 18 of the MDA exist. It is 
also possible for an accused to remain silent, but under s. 261 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code,21 if he raises a defence at trial that was not raised when he was charged, adverse 
inferences may be drawn as regards his guilt.22  
 
All things considered, if an accused drug courier wants to maximise his chances of escaping 
the gallows and at the same time avoid the evidential guillotine highlighted by the judge in 
Chum Tat Suan, he essentially has two options. If he is caught with a huge quantity of drugs 
                                                 
18 Ibid at [6]. 
19 Ibid at [7]. It appears that the decision as to whether the death penalty was nonetheless appropriate was not 
made in this judgment. 
20 On the connection between the two see M. Menlowe, ‘Bentham, Self-Incrimination and the Law of Evidence’ 
(1988) 104(2) Law Quarterly Review  286 at 303–306; A. Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of 
Innocence’ (2006) 10(4) International Journal of Evidence & Proof 241 at 255–256;  
21 Chapter 68, Revised Edition 2012. 
22 However, adverse inferences cannot be used to bolster an otherwise evidentially weak case: Took Leng How v 
Public Prosecutor [2006] 2 SLR(R) 70 at [43]. 
and a conviction upon the likely charge may result in the death penalty, short of him having 
robust defences against the statutory presumptions against him, he will probably want to 
admit that he is part of a drug syndicate before he is convicted and hope he is found to have 
rendered substantial assistance to the CNB so that s. 33B of the MDA can be successfully 
invoked. On the other hand, if he is unsure that the likely charge may result in the death 
penalty, he may try to strike some kind of bargain with the prosecution beforehand that the 
quantity of drugs he is charged with trafficking does not trigger the death penalty. But for 
both options, he is required to plead guilty at some point, while the prosecution holds all of 
the cards. 
 
A Member had raised this concern when the 2012 amendments to the MDA were debated in 
Parliament. He asked if accused drug couriers ‘will be pressurised into incriminating 
themselves’ in the calculated hope of avoiding the death penalty.23 In response, the Minister 
for Law said: ‘if the accused knows something, and has to decide between trying to run a 
false defence that he knows nothing, and telling the truth and assisting the CNB – I do not 
think Members will argue against giving him an incentive to tell the truth, to help us, and to 
help himself.’24 This response, of course, is generally consistent with Singapore’s 
subscription to the ‘crime control’ model of criminal justice, which prioritises successful 
convictions over procedural rights.25 It is also generally consistent with the philosophy 
espoused by the courts: for instance, the Court of Appeal has ruled that the right to silence 
(which overarches the privilege against self-incrimination)26 is neither a rule of natural justice 
nor a constitutional right,27 while the High Court has ruled that the right to silence is an 
impediment to an accused establishing whatever defence he has in a timely manner.28 In 
perspective, however, the right to silence has largely been modified or abrogated in other 
jurisdictions as well; one commentator describes the right as only being ‘theoretically intact’ 
in England.29 Be that as it may, the fact that an accused drug courier now has an additional 
disincentive to remain silent is, at the very least, another step away from his basic right to 
presumption of innocence. Moreover, jurisdictions that have abolished or come close to 
abolishing the right to silence may not have laws carrying the death penalty. 
 
Then there is the matter of extending prosecutorial discretion that was not directly addressed 
by the court in Chum Tat Suan. Quite apart from the problem of having the prosecution 
certify substantial assistance only after the conviction, there is the prior question of whether it 
should even be the prosecution that does this certification. While it is true that a sub-section 
in s. 33B of the MDA allows the certification decision to be challenged on the grounds of bad 
faith or malice, recent case law has confirmed that any challenge of prosecutorial discretion 
involves a few hurdles.30 First, there is always a presumption that the prosecution has 
exercised prosecutorial discretion in accordance with the law. Second, the burden is on the 
accused to adduce (prima facie) evidence of any improper exercise of prosecutorial 
                                                 
23 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012 
(Eugene Tan). 
24 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 November 2012 
(K Shanmugam). 
25 See generally M. Chng, ‘Modernising the Criminal Justice Framework: The Criminal Procedure Code 2010’ 
(2010) 23(1) Singapore Academy of Law Journal 23. 
26 A. Keane and P. McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence, 9th edn (Oxford University Press: 2012) 409. 
27 Public Prosecutor v Mazlan bin Maidun [1992] 3 SLR(R) 968 at [15]–[19]. 
28 Yap Giau Beng Terence v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 SLR(R) 855 at [38]. 
29 Keane and McKeown, above n. 26 at 595. 
30 See Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49; Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor 
[2012] 2 SLR 872; Quek Hock Lye v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 1012. 
discretion. Third, even if the prosecution had exercised discretion improperly, the court can 
only make a declaration to that effect but it has no power to do anything else. In this regard, 
there is no precedent in which prosecutorial discretion has successfully been challenged, and 
s. 33B is also silent as to the consequence of successfully challenging the certification 
decision. 
 
In light of all of this, some may take the view that it should be the court rather than the 
prosecution that decides if the courier had indeed rendered substantial assistance to the CNB, 
or alternatively, the threshold for certification should be lowered – for instance, to that of 
good faith cooperation.31 However, both possibilities were firmly rejected by the Minister for 
Law during the parliamentary debates. With respect to the former, he said that this was a 
matter relating to ‘operational information’, which the prosecution has a better understanding 
of and also has a duty of confidence not to disclose.32 With respect to the latter, he said it was 
not a realistic option as couriers may be ‘primed’ by the sophisticated syndicates with stories 
so as just to appear to cooperate.33 It would seem then that ultimately, the Singapore 
government remains committed as ever in its crusade against drugs and sees no need to 
recalibrate the state-versus-individual dichotomy for criminal proceedings. In the words of 
the Minister for Law: ‘The issue is not what we can do to help couriers avoid capital 
punishment. It is about what we can do to enhance the effectiveness of the [MDA] in a non-
capricious and fair way without affecting our underlying fight against drugs.’34 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 See also Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 
November 2012 (Edwin Tong): ‘By definition, an accused trafficker who satisfies the criteria in [s. 33B] is 
likely to be a relatively low level transporter or assistant. That person is not likely to be in a position to give any 
substantive assistance especially if that assistance is to lead to some tangible disruption outcome … I wonder 
whether the threshold is not set too high. Such a requirement would likely disadvantage the offender who was 
sitting at the lower end of the hierarchy with little or no information on the senior members of the inner 
workings of the syndicate … It is possible that the assistance rendered or the information provided by the 
offender may either not be immediately or be fully appreciated. It is entirely possible that such information or 
assistance provided by the offender could be useless on its own but when put together with other pieces of 
information, obtained from other sources at other times, the fuller picture could well be very useful, and this 
may take several months or even years.’ 
32 Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 November 2012 
(K Shanmugam). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
